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I. INTRODUCTION
Australia, like the United States and Canada, is a federation of six states
and two self-governing territories' that have been left with considerable
autonomy to regulate private law. Unlike the United States and Canada (if one
can still include Quebec), Australia has the advantage of a shared common law
subject to the interpretation of the one supreme court, the High Court of
Australia.
As the Australian Law Reform Commission remarked in its report on
choice of law: "The main scope for conflict within Australia arises in respect

* Professor of Law, Bond University, Queensland, Australia.
1. I am not considering either the non selfgoverning Jervis Bay Territory and its three
hundred inhabitants situated some two hundred kilometers south of Sydney (which for practical
purposes is part of the Australian Capital Territory) or the three inhabited external territories of
Christmas Island, the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, and Norfolk Island. So far these territories have
not raised any conflict of laws problems although Norfolk Island might offer some interesting
"antiques" for the discriminating forum shopper.
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of statute law," 2 perhaps because one jurisdiction reforms the common law
and the other does not, or because each reforms the common law in different
ways. For example, my home state of New South Wales was slow to abolish
the common-law rule that the plaintiff's contributory negligence is an absolute
3 and has never completely abolished interspousal tort
bar to recovery
4
immunity.
The major sources of conflicts within Australia can readily be identified.
First, New South Wales's continued adherence to the six-year limitation period
first set by James I as a general period of limitation contrasts with other states
that have followed modem English precedent in imposing a three-year period
for personal injury actions. 5 Second, states differ substantially in the law of
defamation. In some states the common law still prevails, while others have
either codified the law or substantially' changed it. In some states truth is a
sufficient defense; in others it must also be shown that the making of the
statement is for the public benefit. The abolition in New South Wales of the
right to recover punitive damages in defamation has made the A.C.T. a refuge
for the defamed. 6 Third, the introduction of no-fault insurance schemes for
motor accidents in some jurisdictions7 and the capping of damages recoverable
in relation to such accidents in others' leave the State of Queensland as a
bastion of the common law. There are differences in prejudgment and
postjudgment rates of interest9 and in the rates of discount used in calculating
the lump sum award for future economic loss.'" As a result, certain jurisdictions in Australia will offer a plaintiff either a recovery that is denied in the
"natural forum"" or the chance of a much greater recovery than could be
2. Australian Law Reform Commission Report No. 58 (1992).
3. See Anderson v. Eric Anderson Radio & T.V. Pty. Ltd., 114 C.L.R. 20 (1965).
4. See Warren v. Warren, [1972] Q.R. 386; Corcoran v. Corcoran, [1974] V.R. 164. The
problem disappeared with the purported abolition of interspousal immunity in section 119 of the
federal Family Law Act 1975, but the constitutional validity of this provision has never been
tested.
5. See McKain v. R.W. Miller & Co. (S. Austl.) Pty. Ltd., 174 C.L.R. 1 (1991), An
attempt has been made to reduce the conflict by the enactment of the Choice of Law (Limitation
Periods) Act 1993 in New South Wales and Victoria, but this legislation may not affect tort
actions. See P.M. NORTH & J.J. FAwcETr, CHESHIRE & NORTH'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW 80 (12th ed. 1992) (commenting on the equivalent Foreign Limitations Period Act 1984
(Eng.)).
6. See, e.g., Waterhouse v. Australian Broadcasting Corp., 97 F.L.R. 1 (1989).
7. See Breavington v. Godleman, 169 C.L.R. 41 (1988).
8. See Stevens v. Head, 176 C.L.R. 433 (1993).
9. Guidera v. Gov't Ins. Office, 11 M.V.R. 423 (1990).
10. Amor v. Macpak Pty. Ltd., 95 F.L.R. 10 (1989).
11. In the sense used by Lord Goff of Chieveley, the "natural forum" is the country with
which the action has the closest and most real connection. Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex
Ltd., [19871 App. Cas. 460, 478 (Eng.) (quoting the Abidin Daver, [1984] App. Cas. 398, 415
(Eng)).
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had in that forum. This may lead to the much decried practice of "forum
shopping."
Who is a forum shopper? In a strict sense this term should only refer to
a person who resorts to a jurisdiction other than the natural forum primarily
for the purpose of gaining a procedural or substantive advantage under the law
or practice of that jurisdiction. In some cases a plaintiff might go to an
apparently unrelated jurisdiction to seek such advantage. For example, in
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Inc.'2 the plaintiff brought action in the only
jurisdiction where her action was not barred by statute. There are many more
cases in which the plaintiff had a choice based on reasonable grounds among
several jurisdictions and chose the more advantageous. 3 In a broader and
nonpejorative sense "forum shopper" may refer to any person who seeks the
more advantageous forum from among several available. The forum selected
might be the natural forum or it might be less appropriate. In any case, forum
shopping arises when the plaintiff has a choice.
Those who oppose forum shopping argue that the plaintiff should not have
a choice so far as outcome is concerned.' 4 I leave aside the issue of choice
based on considerations of convenience. Forum shopping opponents would
agree with the Australian Law Reform Commission that uniformity of result,
at least within Australia, is a desirable aim of judges and legislators. 5 If that
goal is to be achieved, Australian jurisdictions must either adopt choice-of-law
rules that ensure uniformity of outcome or restrict the jurisdictional choice of
plaintiffs. I will discuss those options in this Paper. The discussion will be
confined to choice of law and jurisdiction within Australia, as it is clearly
much harder to achieve uniformity of outcome on an international level.

12. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
13. The plaintiff in McKain v. R.W. Miller & Co. (S. Austl.) Pty. Ltd., 174 S.L.R. 1
(1991), brought action in New South Wales where he normally lived rather than in South
Australia where the accident occurred and where he was statutorily barred. Equally, Mrs. Stevens
brought suit in Queensland (where the defendant resided) rather than in either New South Wales
(where she had been run over and where the damages recoverable were capped) or New Zealand
(where she lived and where a no-fault scheme was in operation). Stevens v. Head, 176 C.L.R.
433 (1993).
14. There are scholars who consider forum shopping to be a healthy part of the international
legal system in that it allows plaintiffs to by-pass outdated and restrictive laws. See Juenger, What
is Wrong with Forum Shopping, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 5 (1994). Contra Opeskin, The Price of
Forum Shopping: A Reply, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 14 (1994); Juenger, Forum Shopping: A
Rejoinder, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 28 (1994).
15. A.L.R.C. Report No. 58, supra note 2, 2.4 (1992).
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I1. CHOICE OF FORUM

The common law imposed certain restrictions on the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction based on notions of territorial power. 16 Far from restricting the
choice of forum, the Australian legislatures have widened considerably the
options for plaintiffs in two unique pieces of legislation (the federal Service
and Execution of Process Act 1992 and the joint federal/state/territorial
cross-vesting legislation) and the borrowed mechanism of diversity jurisdiction.
A. JurisdictionBased on Service Within Territory
The traditional rule was aptly stated by Chief Justice Dixon in Laurie v.
Carroll: "The defendant must be amenable or answerable to the command of
the writ. His amenability depended and still primarily depends upon nothing
but presence within the jurisdiction."" The continued existence of tag or
transient jurisdiction has been repeatedly affirmed in recent years by
Australian courts.'" It matters not that the defendant has come into the
jurisdiction at the invitation of the plaintiff and in collusion against the
defendant's insurer.' 9 Nor does it make any difference that the defendant
came into the jurisdiction in reply to a summons or subpoena."0 Once the
defendant is served within the jurisdiction, the court has a general jurisdiction
over the cause of action wherever it may have arisen. 2'
Provided the plaintiff can find his or her prey within the state or territory,
the choice of forum will usually be safe. The High Court of Australia rejected
in Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co. Inc. v. Fa 2 the concept of forum
non conveniens as developed in the United States and the United Kingdom."
Instead it developed in Voth v. ManildraFlourMills Pty. Ltd. the notion that
a plaintiff is prima facie entitled to the jurisdiction it has regularly invoked
unless it can be established that the forum chosen is "clearly inappropriate." 4

16. See the remarks of Chief Justice Dixon in Laurie v. Carroll, 98 C.L.R. 310, 323, (1958)
following the dictum of Justice Holmes in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) that
"[tihe foundation of jurisdiction is physical power."
17. Laurie, 98 C.L.R. at 323.
18. See, e.g., Evers v. Firth, 10 N.S.W.L.R. 22 (1987); Perrett v. Robinson, [1985] 1 Qd.
83; Tuckerman v. Neville, [1992] 2 Q.R. 657; cf. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604
(1990).
19. Evers v. Firth, 10 N.S.W.L.R. 22 (1987).
20. Baldry v. Jackson, [1976] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 19.
21. Tuckerman v. Neville, [1992] 2 Q.R. 657.
22. 165 C.L.R. 197 (1988).
23. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Spiliada Maritime Corp. v.
Cansulex Ltd., [1987] App. Cas. 460.
24. 171 C.L.R. 538 (1990).
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The onus rests upon the defendant and can basically be discharged only by
showing that the cause of action arose outside the forum and the burden
imposed on the defendant by having to appear in the forum outweighs any
legitimate advantage such as costs or favorable limitation period that the
plaintiff enjoys in the forum.2 6 It is not surprising that successful attempts to
stay local actions on this ground have been rare. Since the introduction of the
cross-vesting scheme, it is also possible to seek the transfer of proceedings
from one superior court to another. However, it is uncertain whether the onus
on the applicant for such a transfer differs substantially from that laid down
in Voth v. ManildraFlourMills Pty. Ltd.27
B. JurisdictionBased on Interstate Service
Under the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992
In section 51 of the Australian Constitution, the drafters granted the
Federation the legislative power to recognize "throughout the Commonwealth
of the laws, the public Acts and records, and the judicial proceedings of the
States." 28 This power was exercised in relation to judicial proceedings in the
first year of federation in the Service and Execution of Process Act 1901.
Section 4 of that statute, in effect for ninety-three years, authorized the service
of process out of any Australian court of record on any person within
Australia, thus lifting by federal authority the limits state borders set on the
service of process issued out of state courts. However, if the defendant failed
to appear or protested the jurisdiction of the court, leave to proceed was
required under section 11(1) which required a certain nexus between the
litigation and the forum much along the lines of the English Supreme Court
Rules, as they then stood.29
The Service and Execution of Process Act 1992, which came into effect
on April 10, 1993, has taken that process a step further. The 1992 act did
away with the nexus requirements of the previous statute. Unlike its predecessor, the act applies to the exclusion of state and territorial laws dealing with
service of process within Australia30 and provides in section 15(1) for
initiating process issued out of any Australian court to be served throughout
Australia, including its external territories. As a result, the territorial ambit of

25. Westpac Banking Corp. v. P & 0 Containers Ltd., 102 A.L.R. 239, 243-44 (1991) (per
Pincus, J.).
26. This was the basis upon which jurisdiction was denied in Voth, 171 C.L.R. at 538, but
only after the defendant undertook not to plead the statute of limitations of Missouri, the
"natural" forum.
27. Id.; see also Waterhouse v. Australian Broadcasting Corp., 97 F.L.R. 1 (1989).
28. AUSTL. CONST. § 51 (xxv).

29. See Luke v. Mayoh, 29 C.L.R. 435, 438-39 (1921).
30. Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) § 8(4).
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the Local Court at North Sydney is extended from the icy Wastes of Mawson
Base in the Australian Antarctic Territory to the idyllic Indian Ocean Islands
and the very tip of Cape York in the north! Since the act does no more than
extend the common-law jurisdiction based on service, the defendant need only
be a transient visitor to any part of Australia and the cause of action may be
foreign to Australia."
In principle a plaintiff can choose a venue within the same geographic
range or even, following the example of the late Professor Orr, sue the
defendant in every court in the federation.32 Does this mean that malicious
plaintiffs can run riot and haul defendants before a forum three thousand or
more kilometers away?
The change, recommended by the Australian Law Reform Commission
in its Report on Service and Execution of Process,33 was designed to avoid
the needless and highly technical problems that arose under the previous
legislation of discovering where a contract was broken or a tort committed.
Instead it proposed that the test should be one of determining the appropriate
venue. Section 20(3) allows a court, other than a Supreme Court,34 to grant
a stay of proceedings to a defendant on the ground that a court of another state
or territory is the appropriate court to determine the matter. Section 20(4)
directs the court on such an application to consider the following factors:
(a) the places of residence of the parties and the witnesses likely to be
called in the proceeding;
(b) the place where the subject matter of the litigation is situated;
(c) the financial situation of the parties, so far as the court is aware of
them;
(d) any agreement between the parties as to the court or the place in
which the proceedings should be instituted;
(e) the law that would be most appropriate to apply in the proceeding;
and
(f) whether a related or similar proceeding has been commenced against
the person served or another person.
The plaintiff's choice of the place of issue is not itself a relevant consideration.
Provision (e) is worthy of note because it deprives the plaintiff of the
prima facie presumption in favor of the choice of forum that the High Court

31. See the comments of Master Hogan in Kontis v. Barlin, 115 A.C.T.R. 11, 18 (1993).
In McEntee v. Connor, [1994] A.C.L.R. 125 Tas. 6, a writ regarding a tort committed in Japan
was issued out of the Supreme Court of Tasmania and served under the Service and Execution
of Process Act 1992 on a defendant in Western Australia.
32. Orr v. Isles, [1963] NSWR 616. The plaintiff in that case brought suit in every Supreme
Court outside Tasmania in an attempt to vindicate himself after the Tasmanian Court dismissed
his wrongful dismissal action against the University of Tasmania.
33. Service and Execution of Process, A.L.R.C. Report No. 40.
34. Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth) § 20(1).
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conferred generally on the plaintiff in Voth v. ManildraFlourMills Proprietory Ltd.35 The reference to the "appropriate" forum is most likely a reference
to the "more appropriate" or "natural forum," as defined by Lord Goff of
Chieveley in Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd.36 It is unlikely that
any Australian forum could be described as clearly inappropriate. 37 The
plaintiff whose action is stayed under this provision must start fresh in the
more appropriate forum. No doubt, if the forum were unreasonably chosen the
plaintiff would be penalized in costs. There are therefore some practical
sanctions against abuse.
In the case of process issued out of a supreme court and served under the
Service and Execution of Process Act 1992, the appropriate remedy for a
defendant who complains that the forum selected by the plaintiff is not
appropriate is to seek a transfer to another participating superior court
pursuant to section 5 of the cross-vesting legislation or to seek a stay under
common-law principles.38 The principles to be applied to an application for
a stay under section 20(2) of the act or for a transfer under section 5 of the
cross-vesting legislation ought to be the same.39
C. The Cross-vestingLegislation
The cross-vesting scheme has been in operation since July 1, 1988, and
is implemented through the federal Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act
1987 and equivalent legislation enacted in each of the states and the two
self-governing territories. It is beyond the scope of this Paper to explain the
system in detail but fundamentally its purposes are: (a) to invest all state and
territorial supreme courts with the jurisdiction of the federal and family courts
subject to certain specified exceptions, (b) to invest the federal and family
courts with the whole of the jurisdiction of the state and territorial supreme
courts, (c) to invest each state and territorial supreme court with the whole of
the jurisdiction of all other state and territorial supreme courts, and (d) to
provide a mechanism whereby proceedings filed in an inappropriate court can
be transferred to another superior court within the scheme.4" The legislation
was designed primarily to overcome embarrassing gaps that had opened
between federal and state jurisdictions; however, the extension of cross-vesting

35. 171 C.L.R. 538 (1990).
36. [1987] App. Cas. 460, 477-78.
37. McEntee v. Connor, [1994] A.C.L.R. 125 Tas. 6.
38. Id.; Dawson v. Baker, 120 A.C.T.R. 11 (1994).
39. Dawson v. Baker, 120 A.C.T. 11 (1994).
40. For a general discussion of the operation of the scheme, see Moloney & McMaster,
Cross-vestingof Jurisdiction:A Review of the Operationof the NationalScheme, A.I.J.A. 1992
and Herbert A. Johnson, Historicaland ConstitutionalPerspectives on Cross-vesting of Court
Jurisdiction,19 MELB. U. L. REV. 45 (1993).
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on a mutual state and territorial basis has widened the opportunity for forum
shopping in truly modem style by allowing the plaintiff to "shop at home."
Does a plaintiff seeking to sue in Sydney based on a nation wide telecast wish
to take advantage of the Queensland Defamation Law of 1922? Just plead it
in the Sydney proceedings by way of cross-vesting. 4' Does a Queensland
Supreme Court judge in proceedings that arise out of a motor accident in
Queensland wish to appoint a trustee for a mentally impaired plaintiff resident
in New South Wales? Just exercise the powers that a New South Wales
42
Supreme Court judge has under the Protected Estates Act 1983 (N.S.W.).
Needless to say, the interstate law must be applicable under its own terms
to the situation before the court. The New South Wales Supreme Court could
not apply through cross-vesting the Queensland Defamation Law to a
defamation entirely centered in New South Wales. The jurisdiction must be
one that the Queensland court could have exercised, but it is no longer
necessary to travel to Queensland to institute proceedings there.
It is more dubious whether cross-vesting can be used to assume personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. Assume that a defendant to an action that is
entirely located in South Australia is a resident of South Australia and is
unlikely to come to New South Wales. Assume further that the plaintiff's
action is statutorily barred in South Australia but not in New South Wales.
Can the plaintiff invoke the cross-vested jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
South Australia over defendants personally served there to bring the matter
before the New South Wales Court even though the substantive laws of the
two states are identical? Justice Rogers in Seymour-Smith v. The Electricity
Trust of South Australia43 assumed jurisdiction inter alia on this basis, but the
majority of the Full Court of the Federal Court in David Syme & Co. Ltd. v.
Grey" took the view (correct, in my opinion), that the cross-vesting laws are
concerned with substantive rather than procedural jurisdiction.4" The issue
probably is moot in view of the provisions of the Service and Execution of
Process Act 1992.46

41. Waterhouse v. Australian Broadcasting Corp., 27 N.S.W.L.R. 1 (1992).
42. Re an Alleged Incapable Person FCC & The Protected Estates Act 1983, 19 N.S.W.L.R.
541 (1990) (denying recognition of the Queensland order because the required procedure under
the N.S.W. statute had not been followed). But see Re H & the Adoption Act, [1990] A.C.L.D.
1005 (a New South Wales judge made an adoption order under Victorian legislation).
43. 17 N.S.W.L.R. 648, 659-60 (1989).
44. 115 A.L.R. 247, 254, 275 (1992) (per Neaves & Gummow, J.J., respectively; Higgins,
J. did not express an opinion).
45. See also Keith Mason & James Crawford, The Cross-vesting Scheme, 62 AUSTL. L.J.
328, 335-36 (1988).
46. Although § 8(4) of the act would not overrule any procedural effect of cross-vesting, the
ready availability of service throughout Australia under § 15(1) solves the problem raised in
Seymour-Smith.
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1. Change of Venue under the Cross-vesting Scheme
To counteract possible abuse of the wider scope for forum selection
offered by the cross-vesting legislation and, so far as supreme courts are
concerned, by the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992, provision is
made for the transfer of proceedings from one supreme court to another in
section 5(2) of the cross-vesting legislation.47 Such a transfer shall be ordered
when it appears to the court in which the proceeding is pending that:
(i) the relevant proceeding arises out of, or is related to, another
proceeding pending in the Supreme Court of another State or
Territory and it is more appropriate that the relevant proceeding
be determined by that other Supreme Court;
(ii) having regard to(A)
whether, in the opinion of the first court, apart from this Act and any law
of a State relating to cross-vesting of jurisdiction, the relevant proceeding
or a substantial part of the relevant proceeding would have been incapable
of being instituted in the first court and capable of being instituted in the
Supreme Court of another State or Territory;

(B)
the extent to which, in the opinion of the first court, the matters for
determination in the relevant proceeding are matters arising under or
involving questions as to the application, interpretation or validity of a law
of the State or Territory referred to in sub-sub-subparagraph (A) and not
within the jurisdiction of the first court apart from this Act and any law of
a State relating to cross-vesting of jurisdiction; and

(C)
the interests of justice,

47. Jurisdictionof Courts (Cross-vesting)Act 1987 (Cth). Other subsections of section 5 deal
with various other cross-vestingpossibilities: § 5(1) (transfer from state to federal court or Family
Court of Australia), § 5(3) (transfers between state supreme court and state family court), § 5(4)
(transfers from Federal Court or Family Court of Australia to state and territorial supreme
courts), and § 5(5) (transfers between Federal Court and Family Court).
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it is more appropriate that the relevant proceeding be determined by that other
Supreme Court; or
()

it is otherwise in the interests of justice that the relevant proceeding be
determined by the Supreme Court of another State or Territory.
It may be noted that paragraphs (i) and (iii) are not limited to the transfer of
cross-vested jurisdiction. Indeed, section 20(1) of the Service and Execution
of Process Act 1992 envisions that a defendant complaining that an action has
been instituted in the wrong supreme court will make application under section
5(2) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987.48 The same
remedy could be sought by a defendant who was personally served within the
jurisdiction as a transient visitor. No appeal lies from a decision in relation to
the transfer of a proceeding or the reasoning that decision.49 In all probability, at least an "onus of persuasion" lies on the applicant for a transfer.5 0
The test to be applied depends on which of the above categories the
relevant proceeding falls within. The first category deals with the situation in
which related proceedings are pending in different supreme courts. They need
not lie between the same parties, but there must either be a certain degree of
causality between them,"' or there must be a "substantial common question
that arises in both proceedings."' 2 Once the requisite link is shown to exist,
it becomes a question of which court is more appropriate without giving any
specific weight to the choice of forum by the plaintiff.5 3
The second category covers the situation in which the proceeding, or a
substantial part of it, sought to be transferred is based on jurisdiction that the

48. McEntee v. Connor, [19941 A.C.T.R. 125 Tas. 6; Dawson v. Baker, 120 A.C.T.R, 11
(1994).
49. Jurisdictionof Courts (Cross-vesting) Acts 1987 § 13(a); Tangalooma Island Resort Pty.
Ltd. v. Miles, 96 F.L.R. 47 (1989).
50. Bourke v. State Bank, 85 A.L.R. 61, 76 (1988) (per Wilcox J.); see also In the Marriage
of Chapman & Jansen, 13 Fam. L.R. 56 (1990); Leithead v. Leithead, 15 Fain. L.R. 56 (1991);
Kenda v. Johnson, 15 Fam. L.R. 369 (1992); Dawson v. Baker, 120 A.C.T.R. 11 (1994). For
a view that there is no onus, see Bankinvest A.G. v. Seabrook, 14 N.S.W.L.R. 711, 727 (1988)
(per Rogers A.J.A.); Rains v. Project Technology Pty. Ltd. 97 F.L.R. 355 (1989); Lamshed v.
Lamshed, 35 F.C.R. 111 (1992); Linter Group Ltd. v. Price Waterhouse, 9 A.C.S.R. 346
(1992). Although Justice Debelle in Pegasus Leasing Ltd. v. Tieco Int'l (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. denied
there was a formal onus, he did in fact require the applicant for transfer to indicate some greater
advantage to be gained by transfer which would outweigh the plaintiffs selection of the forum.
61 S.A.S.R. 195 (1993). See also Johnson, supra note 40, at 45.
51. Re Hamilton-Irvine, 94 A.L.R. 428, 432-33 (1991) (per Beaumont, J.).
52. Skaventzos v. Tirimon, 61 S.A.S.R. 103 (1993).
53. Rayner v. Pittard, 99 F.L.R. 111 (1990); Ace. Fin. Int'l See. Ltd. v. National Trustees
Ex'rs & Agency Co. Ltd., 99 F.L.R. 432 (1990).
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forum can only exercise because of the cross-vested jurisdiction. The decision
to transfer the proceeding to the court to which it properly belongs will depend
on where the substance of the proceeding lies; if all or most matters raised in
the proceeding are cross-vested, the proceeding usually will be transferred to
the proper court. 4 However, if there is a substantial issue within the forum's
own jurisdiction to which the cross-vested jurisdiction is incidental, the
transfer may be refused. 5
The third category, perhaps the most relevant, is based on a residual
clause that can be invoked by a defendant even though there are no related
proceedings and no question of cross-vested jurisdiction. 6 Although facially
the court is given a wide discretion as indicated by the words "otherwise in the
interests of justice,"57 some judges have taken the view that a transfer should
be ordered only when the forum chosen by the plaintiff is "clearly inappropriate."58 Others have taken the view that the formula allows the court to
choose the more appropriate forum without any specific emphasis in favor of
the forum chosen by the plaintiff.59 Because section 20(4) of the Service and
Execution of Process Act 1992 clearly denies any bias in favor of the
plaintiff's choice, it would be unfortunate if the method of challenging
jurisdiction indicated by section 20(1) of that act were to employ a different
test.
D. Diversity Jurisdiction
Another option for forum selection is through exercising diversity
jurisdiction with the High Court of Australia. Section 75(iv) of the Constitution invests the High Court with original jurisdiction in all matters "[b]etween
States, or between residents of different States, or between a State and a
resident of another State."6 We are not concerned with the first category, but
the last two give the private plaintiff an opportunity to commence an action in

54. In the Marriage of Chapman & Jansen, 13 Fain. L.R. 863 (1990); Re T (an infant),
[1990] 1 Qd. R. 196, 200 (per Ryan, J.); Down to Earth Spring Water Pty. Ltd. v. State Bank,
31 F.C.R. 81 (1991).
55. Kenda v. Johnson, 15 F.L.R. 369 (1992).
56. See, e.g., Waterhouse v. Australian Broadcasting Corp. 97 F.L.R. 1 (1989).
57. Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987.
58. Id. Baffsky v. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd., 97 A.C.T.R 1 (1990); Mullins Inv. Pty. Ltd.
v. Elliott Exploration Co: Pty. Ltd., [1990] W.A.R. 531.
59. See, e.g., Bankinvest A.G. v. Seabrook, 14 N.S.W.L.R. 711, 730 (1988) (per Rogers,
A.J.A.) (followed in Amor v. Macpak Pty. Ltd., 95 F.L.R. 10 (1989); Sunbanc Australia v.
Multivest Corp. Ltd., 97 F.L.R. 269 (1989); Chase Corp. (Austl.) Ltd. v. City of Melbourne,
97 F.L.R. 258 (1989).
60. See McEntee v. Connor, [1994] A.C.L.R. 125 Tas. 6; Dawson v. Baker, 120 A.C.T.R.
11(1994).
61. AUSTL. CONST. § 75(iv).
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one of the several registries that the High Court maintains throughout the
nation.
The term "resident" has been interpreted narrowly so as to exclude
corporate personality.62 Hence all parties to a diversity suit must be natural
persons. 63 However, recently the High Court has widened the definition of
"state" to include government-owned enterprises, such as railways, that are
managed through a government department. 64
The diversity of residence need not have existed at the time the cause of
action arose; it suffices that there is diversity at the time of commencement of
the action.'
Once jurisdiction
exists, it extends to any cause of action
66
wherever it may have arisen.
Although the High Court cannot stay or dismiss such actions on
jurisdictional grounds, section 45(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) authorizes
the court to remit the proceeding "to any Court of a State which has
jurisdiction with regard to the subject matter and the parties." 67 The issue
under the section is not whether the Court will remit (as it invariably does),
but to which court the case will be remitted. In that regard, the High Court
has a very wide discretion.
The requirement that the court to which the matter is remitted have
jurisdiction over the matter and the parties needs only to be read in a generic
sense. The cause of action need be of a kind that that court can entertain, and
the party need be a person over whom that court would have jurisdiction if
that party had been served within the jurisdiction. Once that generic test has
been satisfied, the High Court's remittal by itself confers jurisdiction.6 9
In determining the court to which the matter should be remitted, the High
Court tries to avoid changing the substantive and procedural rights of the
parties.7" In the case of a conflict of laws, there should be a preference for the
jurisdiction of the law indicated by the relevant choice of law rules. Thus, in
the case of an action based on a tort, preference has been given to the court
of the place where the tort was committed. 7' This, however, might lead to a

62. Australasian Temperance & Gen. Mut. Life Assurance Soc'y v. Howe, 31 C.L.R. 290

(1922).
63. Rochford v. Dayes, 84 A.L.R. 405 (1989).
64. Crouch v. Commissioner for Rys. (Qld.), 159 C.L.R. 22 (1985). With the "corporatization" of government enterprises, this will become increasingly less likely.
65. Practice Notes, 40 AusTL. L. J. 361 (1967) (discussing the unreported case, Dzikowsky
v. Mazgay).
66. Spratt v. Hermes, 114 C.L.R. 226, 241 (1965) (per Barwick, C.J.).
67. Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) § 45(1).
68. Johnstone v. Commonwealth, 143 C.L.R. 398 (1979).
69. Id. at 408 (per Aickin, J.).
70. State Bank v. Commonwealth Say. Bank, 154 C.L.R. 579, 586 (1984) (per Gibbs, C.J.).
71. See Johnstone, 143 C.L.R. at 398; Robinson v. Shirley, 149 C.L.R. 132 (1982); Pozniak

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss5/12

12

Nygh: Choice-of-Law Rules and Forum Shopping in Australia

1995]

FORUM SHOPPING

plaintiff being deprived of a procedural advantage that another forum might
have given him or her. 72 As will be shown later, the very fact that the action
has been commenced in the High Court might lead to an escape from certain
state and territorial laws, such as a statute of limitations.
If there is no conflict of laws between potentially applicable laws, the
High Court will look for the most appropriate forum. Matters that have been
considered important in this context include: the place where the plaintiff was
hospitalized and whence the medical evidence would have to come,73 which
court will be able to hear the matter earlier, the availability of legal aid,74
and the defendant's residence.75
III. CHOICE OF LAW
As the foregoing has shown, Australia favors a smorgasbord of jurisdictions for hungry plaintiffs. What, if anything, has our law done to achieve the
policy of "uniformity of outcome" as specified by the Australian Law Reform
Commission? To discuss this, we have to distinguish between (a) jurisdiction
based on service, (b) cross-vesting jurisdiction, and (c) diversity jurisdiction.
A. Choice of Law in JurisdictionBased on Service of Process
When an Australian court assumes jurisdiction, as it does in the vast
majority of cases, on the basis of submission to jurisdiction, service within the
jurisdiction, or service within Australia pursuant to the Service and Execution
of Process Act 1992, it must look to the choice of law rules of the forum to
determine the applicable law. In most cases these rules are defined by the
common law and are uniform throughout Australia, but they do not necessarily
lead to uniformity of outcome.
At one stage it looked as if the majority of the High Court of Australia
agreed with Justice Deane when he said:
What is essential is that the substantive rule or rules applicable to
determine the lawfulness and the legal consequences or attributes of
conduct, property or status at a particular time in a particular part of the
national territory will be the same regardless of whereabouts in that
territory questions concerning those matters or their legal consequences
may arise. In a federation such as Australia where there are a number of

v. Smith, 151 C.L.R. 38 (1982).
72. Pozniak, 151 C.L.R. at 38.
73. Weber v. Aidone, 36 A.L.R. 345 (1981).
74. Crouch v. Commissioner for Rys. (Qld), 159 C.L.R. 22 (1989).
75. Guzowski v. Cook, 149 C.L.R. 128 (1981).
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legislatures and a number of distinct court systems, such unity cannot exist
unless the legal principles for determining legislative competence and for
resolving conflicts between different laws in a particular case will operate
with identical results in any of the different court systems.76
The "vision splendid" of Justice Deane was rejected two years later by the
majority of a differently constituted High Court in McKain v. R. W. Miller &
Co. (SA) Ply. Ltd.77 That majority dismissed the aim of uniformity of
outcome and asserted instead that variety was the very spice of federation.78
Although the majority returned to forum-oriented choice-of-law rules, the
theme adopted by Justice Deane was endorsed by the Australian Law Reform
Commission as its principal aim of reform of choice of law rules in Australia. 9
As the Australian Law Reform Commission rightly noted, a bias toward
the application of the law of the forum is a notable feature of the traditional
choice of law rules inherited in Australia from English precedents. 8" This bias
manifests itself in a broad definition of matters of procedure to be governed
by the law of forum, including limitation rules8" and the assessment and
quantification of damages.' It also manifests itself in a tendency to interpret
home statutes liberally in order to apply them to out-of-state situations. 3 The
notorious rule in Phillips v. Eyre' that the High Court reinstated in McKain' requires each foreign tort action to be threaded through the eye of the
forum's needle.8 6 The common law rules, as interpreted by the present

76. Breavington v. Godleman, 169 C.L.R. 41, 121 (1988); see also id. at 73-74, 98 (per
Mason, C.J., and Wilson & Gaudron, JJ., respectively). This is still the view of Justices Deane
and Gaudron. See Goryl v. Greyhound Austl. Pty. Ltd., 120 A.L.R. 605, 610 (1994). The
minority consisted of Justices Brennan, Dawson, and Toohey.
77. 174 C.L.R. 1 (1991). The majority consisted of Justices Brennan, Dawson, Toohey, and
McHugh. In the intervening period, Justice Wilson retired and had been replaced by Justice
McHugh.
78. Id. at 36-37.
79. Australian Law Reform Commission Report No. 58, supra note 2, 2.4.
80. Id. I para. 1.13.
81. McKain, 174 C.L.R. at 1 (applying the forum's statute of limitations).
82. Stevens v. Head, 176 C.L.R. 433 (1993) (ignoring capping by place of wrong).
83. Guidera v. Government Ins. Office, 11 M.V.R. 423 (1990) (New South Wales court
applies New South Wales Motor Traffic legislation to the consequences of an accident arising out
of the use of a car registered in New South Wales outside that state and where none of the parties
involved were resident in that state).
84. 6 L.R.-Q.B. 1 (Eng. 1870).
85. See P.E. Nygh, The Miraculous Raising of Lazarus, 22 U.W. AUSTL. L. REV. 386
(1992).
86. Jones v. T.C.N. Channel Nine Pty. Ltd., 26 N.S.W.L.R. 732 (1992) (plaintiffsuing in
New South Wales cannot recover punitive damages for defamation committed in Queensland).
Cf. Red Sea Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Bouygues S.A., [1994] 3 All E.R. 751 (a recent decision of the
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majority of the High Court, favor the forum shopper. As Justice Deane said
in Stevens v. Head,7 the approach adopted by the current majority of the
High Court of Australia "goes a long way towards converting the Australian
legal system into a national market in which forum shoppers are encouraged
to select between competing laws imposing different legal consequences in
respect of a single occurrence."88
B. Choice of Law in Cross-vested Jurisdiction
The Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 contains its own
choice of law rules in section 11(1) that apply when "it appears to a court that
the court will, or will be likely to" be exercising cross-vested jurisdiction. 9
Leaving aside the now largely theoretical possibility of exercising "procedural" cross-vested jurisdiction, there appear to be two such situations: (a) where
a party raises a right of action under the written law of another state or
territory that is not made applicable through the application of the choice of
law rules of the forum' and (b) where a proceeding, whether originally lying
in the cross-vested jurisdiction, is transferred pursuant to section 5 of the
cross-vesting legislation.9 While the most obvious instance of a right of
action arising under a written law is the case of a statutory cause of action
created by legislation such as the Fatal Accidents Act, the definition may be
wider. Justice Gummow has suggested that the words have a wider operation,
including:
(i) an action which depends upon the written law for its enforcement even
though not wholly owing its existence to the written law, and (ii) an action
in which the defence against a common law liability or obligation is
provided by the written law so that the determination of the action depends
upon the operation of the written law, that law being the source of an
alleged immunity to the liability or obligation alleged against the defendant....92

Privy Council on appeal from Hong Kong in which the law of the forum was excluded in favor
of the law of the place of wrong).
87. 176 C.L.R. 433 (1993).
88. Id. at 462.
89. Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 § 11(1).
90. See Re an Alleged Incapable Person F.C.C. & The Protected Estates Act 1983, 19
N.S.W.L.R. 541 (1990); Re H & the Adoption Act [1990] A.C.L.D. 1005. Of course, the
interstate statutory right of action may also become applicable through a choice of law rule. This
will depend on how the cause of action is pleaded. See Jones v. T.C.N. Channel Nine Pty. Ltd.,
26 N.S.W.L.R. 732 (1992).
91. Waterhouse v. Australian Broadcasting Corp., 25 N.S.W.L.R. 519 (1991).
92. David Syme & Co. v. Grey, 115 A.L.R. 247, 260 (1993).
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Section 11(1) sets out three choice-of-law rules. The first is the basic rule: the
court shall apply the law of the forum, including choice of law rules. 9' In one
sense this is the most radical rule; a transfer of a proceeding under section 5
might result in a change of the applicable law,94 but the basic rule can only
be applied where the jurisdiction is cross-vested by reason of a transfer of the
proceeding.
The second rule applies when a party seeks to assert a right of action
arising under a written law of another state or territory, the other method of
invoking cross-vested jurisdiction. In this situation, the court shall "apply the
written and unwritten law of that other state or territory." 95 The interstate
statute must, of course, apply to the situation before the court, but it need not
be a law made relevant by the choice-of-law rules of the forum. In 96
fact,
choice-of-law rules are by-passed; the forum shopper can shop at home.
The operation of these rules can be illustrated by reference to the much
litigated case of Waterhouse v. Australian Broadcasting Corp.9' In that case
the plaintiff had commenced proceedings for defamation in the Supreme Court
of the Australian Capital Territory alleging to have been defamed throughout
Australia in a telecast by the defendant. The action was brought in the normal
(i.e., not cross-vested) jurisdiction of that court, but upon its transfer to the
Supreme Court of New South Wales under section 5(2) of the Jurisdiction of
Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987, it became cross-vested jurisdiction in that
court.98
Australian law does not have a single publication rule for multi-state
defamation, but the tort is regarded as having been committed wherever the
telecast is received.99 The tort of defamation is codified in Queensland" 0
and Tasmania' 01 and extensively amended by statute in New South
Wales."2 In other jurisdictions the common law still largely applies.
The plaintiff's major concern was to recover punitive damages, a
common-law right abolished in New South Wales but still alive and well in the

93.
94.
95.
96.

Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 § 11(1).
Australian Broadcasting Corp. v. Waterhouse, 25 N.S.W.L.R. 519 (1991).
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 § 11(1)(b).
See SYKES & PRYLES, AUSTRALIAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 252 (3d ed. 1991).

97. See Waterhouse v. Australian Broadcasting Corp., 97 F.L.R. I (A.C.T. 1989);
Australian Broadcasting Corp. v. Waterhouse, 25 N.S.W.L.R. 519 (N.S.W. Ct. App. 1991);
Waterhouse v. Australian Broadcasting Corp., [1992] A.C.L.R. 145 N.S.W. I (cited in David

Syme & Co. Ltd. v. Grey, 115 A.L.R. 247, 259-60 (1993) (per Gummow, J.)); Waterhouse v.
Australian Broadcasting Corp., 27 N.S.W.L.R. 1 (1992).
98. Waterhouse v. Australian Broadcasting Corp., 97 F.L.R. 1 (1989).
99. David Syme & Co. Ltd. v. Grey, 115 A.L.R. 247 (1993).
100. Defamation Law of 1889 (QId).
101. Defamation Act 1957 (Tas).
102. Defamation Act 1974 (NSW).
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other jurisdictions. The transfer to New South Wales meant he could no longer
rely on Australian Capital Territory law because of the operation of the basic
rule. He could amend the pleadings to rely on New South Wales law alone
pursuant to the basic rule, in which case he could refer to the laws of the other
jurisdiction as the loci delicti under the choice of law rules of New South
Wales. In that case, however, he could not recover any kind of damage not
permitted by the law of the forum, prohibiting the recovery. 103 By invoking
the statutes of Tasmania and Queensland directly through cross-vesting, the
second rule was brought into operation: the New South Wales Court had to
apply the whole law of those states, including their unwritten (common) law
in so far as it implemented or supplemented the statutory cause of action
pleaded. This meant that the law of New South Wales became irrelevant and
that the plaintiff could assert the common-law right to punitive damages still
existing in those states. 1' 4 Whether he could ask the New South Wales
Supreme Court in its cross-vested Queensland jurisdiction to assess damages
on an Australia-wide basis will be an interesting question. 05
The third choice-of-law rule deals with the application of rules of
evidence and procedure"° and is as unorthodox as the second. Generally in
Australia the law of the forum governs questions of evidence and procedure. 0 7 Because section 11(3) provides that, upon transfer, the transferee
court shall deal with the proceeding as if all steps, including steps taken in the
transferor court, had taken place in the transferee court, the usual inference is
that the procedural law of the transferee court will apply.' This usual rule
is subject to any order of the transferee court.
This third rule allows the court exercising cross-vested jurisdiction to
apply the evidentiary and procedural rules of any state or territory "as the
court considers appropriate in the circumstances." " 9 This goes one step
further than the second rule. The second rule did away with choice-of-law
considerations but still requires applicability. The third rule offers a pure
better law choice and does not seem to require any relevance. It would
therefore be open to a transferee court to order that the statute of limitations
of the transferor court should apply. Under section 13(b) of the cross-vesting
legislation, no appeal can lie from the choice of procedural law made. "0

103. Jones v. TCN Channel Nine Pty. Ltd., 26 N.S.W.L.R. 732 (1992).
104. Waterhouse v. Australian Broadcasting Corp., 27 N.S.W.L.R. 1 (1992).
105. Compare Toomey v. Mirror Newspapers Ltd., [1985] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 173, with David
Syme & Co. v. Grey, 115 A.L.R. 247 (1993).
106. Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 § 1(1)(c).
107. Stevens v. Head, 176 C.L.R. 433 (1993).
108. Seymour-Smithv. Electricity Trust, 17 N.S.W.L.R. 648, 662 (1989) (per Rogers C.J.).
109. Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 § 11(1)(c).
110. Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 § 13(b).
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As the Australian Law Reform Commission pointed out, the provisions
of section 11(1) do not resolve the problem of forum shopping: indeed it
broadens the opportunities."' However, in certain cases, this provision may
offer a like privilege to defendants who can invoke statutory rights of relief
under interstate laws that would otherwise not have been available."' The
Commission recommended that section 11(1) be replaced by the uniform rules
it proposed. "
C. Choice of Law in Diversity Jurisdiction
The question of the law applicable in diversity jurisdiction is regulated by
statute. Sections 79 and 80 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) direct courts
exercising federal jurisdiction, (including the High Court'14) to apply the
common law and statutory law "in force in the State in which the Court in
which the jurisdiction is exercised is held,""' unless there is determinative
federal law.
By itself, this rule would not be remarkable. Because the choice-of-law
rules are largely defined at common law and are uniform, it makes little
difference whether they form part of state or federal common law. The real
relevance of these provisions lies in what state or territorial laws they
incorporate as part of the law applicable in the High Court. Could state laws
regulating the practice and procedure of their courts be invoked to regulate the
practice and procedure of that august tribunal? In John Robertson & Co. v.
Ferguson Transformers Pty. Ltd." 6 Justice Mason drew a distinction between
state laws regulating the practice of state courts generally, made applicable by
sections 79 and 80, and state laws conferring powers on or regulating the
practice of a named court that were not so translated." 7 Although the
remarks were dicta, the distinction has been applied in the Federal Court." 8
The application of a state statute of limitations will thus depend on the
registry of the High Court in which the action is commenced." 9 But what
happens if through remittal the venue is changed?
In Commonwealth of Australia v. Dixon2 ' the plaintiff had filed a

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Australian Law Reform Commission Report No. 58, supra note 2, 3.18.
See, e.g., Bankinvest A.G. v. Seabrook, 14 N.S.W.L.R. 711 (1988).
Australian Law Reform Commission Report No. 58, supra note 2, 3.20.
Musgrave v. Commonwealth, 57 C.L.R. 514, 532 (1937) (per Latham, C.J.).
Judiciary Act 1903 § 80.
129 C.L.R. 65 (1973).
Id. at 94-95.
Trade Practices Comm'n v. Manfal Pty. Ltd., 97 A.L.R. 231, 243 (1990) (per Wilcox,

J.).
119. Pedersen v. Young, 110 C.L.R. 162 (1964).
120. Commonwealth of Australia v. Dixon, 13 N.S.W.L.R. 601, 606 (1988) (per Hope, J.)
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statement of claim in the Melbourne registry of the High Court in 1984
alleging a tort committed by the Commonwealth in 1965. The High Court
remitted that action to the Supreme Court of New South Wales with a direction
that "the action proceed in that Court as if the steps already taken in the action
in this Court had been taken in that Court and as if Sydney had been stated in
the writ to be the place of trial."'. The relevant period of limitations was
three years in Victoria and six years in New South Wales. At first glance it
would appear to present what American conflicts scholars have described as
a no conflict situation.
Not so in the eyes of the New South Wales Court of Appeal. Judge Hope
took the view that the New South Wales limitation provision did not apply
because the proceeding was commenced in Victoria. " Neither was the
Victorian limitations statute applicable since ss 79 and 80 of the Judiciary Act
1903 only made the law of New South Wales relevant in a court sitting in New
South Wales. Accordingly the plaintiff was not statutorily barred.
Judge Samuels sought to avoid that absurdity by reading into the High
Court's direction an indication that section 79 should be applied as if the
action had been instituted in New South Wales, making the New South Wales
limitations statute applicable. 2 3 Judge Mahoney, on the other hand, took the
view that under section 64 of the Judiciary Act 1903 the rights and liabilities
of the Commonwealth should be determined by the law of the forum in which
the action was instituted, bringing the Victorian statute into play. 24 In the
end it was left to the trial judge to decide whether the Victorian or New South
Wales bar should be applied. 'I
It is clearly undesirable that a plaintiff should be able to avoid any
limitations of law by invoking diversity jurisdiction. If the action had been
retained by the High Court in Victoria, the Victorian bar would have been
applied.' 2 6 That position should not be changed to the detriment of the

(citing Pederson v. Young, 110 C.L.R. 162 (1964)); Fielding v. Doran, 60 A.L.R. 342 (1984);
see also Bargen v. State Gov't Ins. Office (Qld.), 154 C.L.R. 318 (1982).
121. Id.
122. See Pedersen, 110 C.L.R. at 162 (1964); Bargen v. State Government Ins. Office
(Qld.), 154 C.L.R. 318 (1982); Fielding v. Doran, 60 A.L.R. 342 (1984).
123. Commonwealth of Australia v. Dixon, 13 N.S.W.L.R. 601, 613-14 (per Samuels, J.).
124. Id. at 624-27 (per Mahoney, J.).
125. Id. at 612 (per Hope, J.).
126. But see Pedersen, 110 C.L.R. at 168, 170 (per Menzies & Windeyer, JJ., respectively,
suggesting that state statutes of limitation do not apply to proceedings in the High Court). This
idea is contrary to the view expressed by Justice Mason in John Robertson & Co. Ltd. v.
Ferguson Transformers Pty. Ltd., 129 C.L.R. 65, 95 (1973).
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defendant's rights by a remittal to another court. 7 Whichever view one
takes, diversity jurisdiction offers the opportunity to escape the provisions of
a limitations statute. The Australian Law Reform Commission did not
recommend repeal of sections 79 and 80, but its recommendations as to choice
of law in matters of procedure (which have been partially implemented for
limitation periods) would
sharply reduce the attractions of diversity jurisdiction
12
to the forum shopper.
D. The Proposalsof the Australian Law Reform Commission
In its proposals for uniform federal, state, and territorial choice-of-law
rules, the Commission sought to reduce, though perhaps not eliminate, the
forum bias which makes forum shopping feasible. It is not the purpose of this
Paper to review the entirety of the recommendations of the Commission, a task
that would require a paper of its own. The Commission suggested changes in
the areas in which forum bias is most pronounced: the first limb of the rule in
Phillips v. Eyre 29 and in matters of procedure.
1. The Rule in Phillips v. Eyre
The rule in Phillips v. Eyre, as restated by the High Court in McKain v.
R.W. Miller & Co. (S.A.) Ply. Ltd., 3 ° arguably 3' sets out a double
choice-of-law rule that measures the civil liability (i.e., the heads of damages
recoverable) of the defendant by reference to both the law of the forum and
the law of the place of wrong. According to the re-formulation of the rule by
Lord Wilberforce in Boys v. Chaplin, on which it is based, the rule is subject
to a flexible exception that in that case allowed the English court to apply the
law of the forum to the exclusion of the law of the place of wrong. 3 2 The
Privy Council held in Red Sea Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bouygues S.A. that in an
appropriate case the flexible exception may justify the exclusion of the law of

idea is contrary to the view expressed by Justice Mason in John Robertson & Co. Ltd. v.
Ferguson Transformers Pty. Ltd., 129 C.L.R. 65, 95 (1973).
127. It has been the practice to require an undertaking from the defendant not to plead a
shorter limitation period in the appropriate forum before granting a stay or making an order for
transfer. See Voth v. Manildra Flour Mills Pty. Ltd. 171 C.L.R. 538 (1990); Seymour-Smith v.
Electricity Trust, 17 N.S.W.L.R. 648 (1989).
128. A.L.R.C. Report, supra note 2, at para. 3.27.
129. 6 L.R.-Q.B. 1 (Eng. 1870).
130. 174 C.L.R. 1 (1991).
131. While the point is not made explicit and is left open in Stevens v. Head, 176 C.L.R.
433 (1993), this is now the accepted reading of Boys v. Chaplin, [1971] App. Cas. 356 (Eng.)
on which the formulation is based. See NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 5, at 540-42.
132. [1971] App. Cas. 356, 385 (Eng.).
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the forum in favor of the law of the place of wrong. 133 The High Court of
Australia has rejected the flexible
exception, at least so far as torts committed
1 34
concerned.
are
Australia
within
The Commission has proposed that the primary rule in relation to torts
should measure liability only by reference to the law of the place of commission of the tort, 135 thus restoring by legislation the position that, it appeared,
136
a majority of the High Court had adopted in Breavington v. Godleman.
This primary rule should be liable to displacement in favor of the law of a
place that in the circumstances has "a substantially greater connection" with
the question or issue before the court. 137 To avoid the tendency of American
courts to apply a similar principle in favor of the law of the forum, the
Commission stressed that the displacement principle is to be seen as "exceptional" and subject to "a heavy onus" on the party seeking to avoid the law of
the place of wrong. 3 8 Depending on its application, this caution would
reduce, though not eliminate, the forum bias of the present rule and produce
greater uniformity of outcome.
2. Procedure
Any change in the rules would be of little effect if the definition of
"procedure" remained as broad as it is now. Indeed it can be argued in the
light of the decision in Stevens v. Head3 9 that any rule that does not
determine the existence of a head of damages is a matter of procedure.
The Commission has recommended that in interstate cases all laws, except
those that provide for the way a proceeding is conducted or a judgment is
enforced, be classified as substantive and governed by the law governing the
substantive issue. ° In tort, the law of the place of wrong (unless the rule
of displacement indicated a different law) would determine such matters as the
application of a statute of limitations,' 4 ' the quantum of damages recoverable,' 42 the amount of prejudgment interest chargeable,' 43 the discount rate
to be charged in calculating future loss,"" the remedies available," 5 the
133. [1994] 3 All E.R. 749 (Eng.).
134. McKain v. R.W. Miller & Co. (S.A.) Pty. Ltd., 174 C.L.R. 1, 38-39 (1991) (per
Brennan, Dawson, Toohey & McHugh, JJ.).
135. Australian Law Reform Commission Report No. 58, supra note 2, 6.27.
136. 169 C.L.R. 41 (1988).
137. Australian Law Reform Commission Report No. 58, supra note 2, 6.62.
138. Id. 6.59.
139. 176 C.L.R. 433 (1993).
140. Australian Law Reform Commission Report, supra note 2, 10.55.
141. Id. 10.33.
142. Id. 10.45.
143. Id. 10.54.
144. Id.
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rules of evidence, and any presumptions to be applied.' 46 However, the
question of whether a civil jury could be called to try the matter would remain
a matter of procedure. 147 This view is strongly supported by the present
Chief Justice of the High Court 48 but remains distinctly a minority view.
The recommendations of the Commission have so far not received a
considered reply from the governments concerned. However, they are being
implemented in one area, limitation periods. The state of New South Wales
has enacted the Choice of Law (Limitation of Periods) Act 1993 as part of
uniform legislation to be enacted throughout Australia and New Zealand.' 49
Section 5 of that statute provides that when the substantive law of another state
or territory, or of New Zealand, is to govern a claim before a New South
Wales court, a limitation statute of that other place is to be regarded as part
of the substantive law. Under section 6, any discretion to extend the period of
limitation must be exercised according to the same law.
Unfortunately the application of the statute is ambiguous as it relates to
torts. As long as the High Court maintains the view that the rule is a double
choice-of-law rule, the unfortunate plaintiff may be met by the worst possible
solution - the plaintiff will be barred by the shortest period of the forum or
the place of wrong. '5 0

IV. CONCLUSION

Australia offers a wide range of available forums. Indeed, following the
entry into force of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 the initial
choice facing the plaintiff is limitless. The abolition of nexus requirements is
in itself commendable; such requirements led to jurisdiction being denied on
mere technicalities such as determination of the place of contracting or breach.
The present law directs the court to issues of the appropriate venue. However,
it is my view that "the appropriate venue" in section 20 does not necessarily
indicate a single venue, and the present law, like the old, continues to offer a
plaintiff a choice of venue even if the stay or transfer provisions are taken into
account. The principles to be applied on a stay application under section 20

145. Id. 10.36.
146. Id. 10.53.
147. Id. 10.18.
148. McKain v. R.W. Miller & Co. (S.A.) Pty. Ltd., 171 C.L.R. 1, 29 (1991).
149. Choice of Law (Limitation Periods) Act 1993 (Vict.); Choice of Law (Limitation
Periods) Act 1994 (W. Austl.); Limitation of Actions (Recovery of Taxes and Substantive Law)
Amendment Act 1994 (S. Austl.).
150. This is the prevailing view under the Foreign Limitations Periods Act 1984 (Eng.). See
NORTH & FAWCETr, supra note 5, at 80.
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should be the same as apply to an application for transfer under section 5 of
the cross-vesting legislation.
5
As Justice Gummow has pointed out in David Syme & Co. v. Grey,1 1
the cross-vesting provisions were designed to deal with gaps in substantive
jurisdiction, not to offer further options in personal jurisdiction. Yet, even on
this more restrictive basis, the provisions offer the plaintiff (and at times the
defendant) the option of invoking the substantive law of another Australian
jurisdiction without commencing suit there. The cross-vesting legislation
therefore has a certain forum-shopping element. At the same time it is a clear
instrument of doing justice. Through its transfer provisions the legislation can
be used to overcome a problem frequently leading to multiple litigation-the
limitation of the plaintiff's remedies in one jurisdiction, and, conversely, the
defendant's inability to get adequate relief in the jurisdiction chosen by the
plaintiff, leading each party to institute proceedings in different courts.,52
The power to transfer proceedings under section 5 should therefore be
exercised without undue regard for the choice made by the plaintiff, although
it is probably true that there must be some onus of persuasion on the applicant
for transfer.
Diversity jurisdiction, in so far as it is available to private litigants, has
no redeeming value except as a means of avoiding limitation statutes. It was
simply copied from the United States' system and is certainly not wanted by
the High Court.
As long as the forum bias remains part of our law,
the judicious selection of the forum will offer the plaintiff a choice of law and
outcome. This can to a certain extent be counteracted through the provisions
for a stay under section 20(3) of the Service and Execution of Process Act
1992, and transfer under section 5 of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting)
Act 1987 although the effect of remittal under section 44 of the Judiciary Act
1903 is dubious. Transfers and stays will not necessarily be granted because
another forum is available and may not be granted where the effect will be to
deprive the plaintiff of a legitimate juridical advantage such as a longer
limitation period. The ultimate solution is to remove the bias through uniform
reform of the choice of law rules. That process has now started piecemeal and
is likely to be slow.

151. 115 A.L.R. 247 (1993).
152. See e.g., Bankinvest A.G. v. Seabrook, 14 N.S.W.L.R. 711 (1988).
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